on scrap paper." Perhaps as telling, the memorandum did not direct a mere study, but the creation of a course of action . Considering the Corps' complete lack of expertise in this emerging field of warfare , Headquarters quickly translated staff plans into reality . The first small group of volunteers reported for training in October 1940 and graduated th e following February . Succeeding classes went through an accelerated program for basic parachute qualification, but the numbers mounte d very slowly . Throughout 1941 the Marine Corp s produced just a trickle of jumpers and remained a long way from possessing a useful tactical entity. Most members of the first three training classe s reported to the 2d Marine Division in San Diego , California, to form the nucleus of the Corps' firs t parachute unit . The 2d Parachute Company (soon redesignated Company A, 2d Parachut e Battalion) formally came into existence on 2 2 March 1941 . The first commanding officer was Captain Robert H . Williams . The majority of the fourth class went to Quantico, Virginia, an d became the nucleus of Company A, 1st Parachute Battalion, on 28 May . Its first commanding officer Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 127-GC-495-50447 9 arrival in the midst of an Army maneuver demonstrated the disruption that parachutists could caus e to unwary opposing units .
was Captain Marcellus J . Howard . From tha t point forward, graduating classes were generally detailed on an alternating basis to each coast . I n the summer of 1941, the West Coast company transferred to Quantico and merged into the 1s t Battalion . Williams assumed command of the two-company organization .
The concentration of the Corps' small paratrooper contingents at Quantico at least allowe d them to begin a semblance of tactical training . The battalion conducted a number of formatio n jumps during the last half of July, some fro m Marine planes and others from Navy patro l bombers . In no case could it muster enoug h planes to jump an entire company at once . Captain Williams used his battalion's time on th e ground to emphasize his belief that "paratroopers are simply a new form of infantry ." His me n learned hand-to-hand fighting skills, went on conditioning hikes, and did a lot of calisthenic exercises . A Time magazine reporter noted that th e parachutists were "a notably tough-looking outfi t among Marines, who all look tough ." One of the battalion's July jumps demonstrated the consternation that paratroopers could instill by their sur -prise appearance on a battlefield . A landing at an airfield near Fredericksburg, Virginia, unexpectedly disrupted maneuvers of the Army's 44t h Infantry Division, because its leaders thought th e Marines were an aggressor force added to the problem without their knowledge . The sam e jump also indicated some of the limitations of airborne operations . An approaching thunderstor m brought high winds which blew many of th e jumpers away from their designated landing sit e Overseas Models T he Soviet Union was the first nation to take a serious interest in parachuting as a means to introduce ground forces into battle . The Red Army created a test unit in 1931 and by 1935 was able to employ two battalions of parachute infantry in field exercises . Beginning in the mid-1930s, several other European nations followed suit . Germany launched a particularly aggressive program, placing it in the air forc e under the command of a former World War I pilot , Major General Kurt Student . The German parachutists were complimented by glider units, an outgrowth of the sport gliding program that develope d flying skills while Germany was under Versaille s Treaty restrictions on rearmament . By 1940 Hitler had 4,500 parachutists at his disposal, organized int o six battalions . Another 12,000 men formed an ai r infantry division designed as an air-landed follow-u p to a parachute assault . A force of 700 Ju-52 transport planes was available to carry these troops into combat and each Ju-52 could hold up to 15 men .
The Soviet Union made the first combat use o f parachute forces . On 2 December 1939, as part of it s initial abortive invasion of Finland, the Red Arm y dropped several dozen paratroopers near Petsam o behind the opposing lines . They apparently came down on top of a Finnish unit, which shot many o f them before they reached the ground . Subsequent Soviet attempts during the Finnish campaign to employ airborne forces, all small in scale, met equally disastrous fates .
Germany's first use of airborne forces achieve d favorable results . As part of the April 1940 invasions of Norway and Denmark, the Luftwaffe assigned a battalion of paratroopers to seize several key installations . In Denmark, two platoons captured a vita l bridge leading to Copenhagen, while another platoon took control of an airfield . In Norway, a company parachuted onto the airfield at Stavanger and quickly overwhelmed its 70 defenders, thus paving the way for the landing of 2,000 air infantrymen . Although these operations were critical to German success in the campaign, they received little attention at th e time, perhaps due to the much larger and bloodie r naval battles that occurred along the Norwegian coast .
German airborne forces achieved spectacular success just one month later. One battalion breached Belgium's heavily fortified defensive line during th e offensive of May 1940 . Four battalions reinforced by two air infantry regiments captured three Dutch airfields, plus several bridges over rivers that bisecte d the German route of approach to the Hague, Holland's capital, and Rotterdam, its principal port. In each case the airborne units held their groun d until the main assault forces arrived overland . The final parachute battalion, supported by two regiment s of air infantry, landed near the Hague with the mission of decapitating the Dutch government and military high command. This force failed to achieve its goals, but did cause considerable disruption .
The last major German use of parachute assault came in May 1941 . In the face of Allied control of th e sea, Hitler launched an airborne invasion of the Mediterranean island of Crete . The objective was t o capture three airfields for the ensuing arrival of airlanded reinforcements . Casualties were heavy among the first waves of 3,000 men landed by parachute and glider, but others continued to pour in . Despite an overwhelming superiority in numbers, th e 42,000 Allied defenders did not press their initial advantage . Late in the second day the Germans began landing transports on the one airstrip they held, even though it was under Allied artillery fire . After a few more days of bitter fighting, the Allie d commander concluded that he was defeated an d began to withdraw by sea .
In the course of the battle, the Germans suffere d 6,700 casualties, half of them dead, out of a tota l force of 25,000 . Allied losses on the island were less than 3,500, although an additional 11,800 troops surrendered and another 800 soldiers died or were wounded at sea during the withdrawal . The Allies decided that airborne operations were a powerful tactic, inasmuch as the Germans had leapfrogged 100 miles of British-controlled waters to seize Crete fro m a numerically superior ground force . As a consequence, the U .S . and British armies would invest heavily in creating parachute and glider units . Hitle r reached the opposite conclusion . Having lost 350 aircraft and nearly half of the 13,000 paratrooper s engaged, he determined that airborne assaults were a costly tactic whose time had passed . The German s never again launched a large operation from the air. and into a grove of trees . Luckily, none of the 4 0 men involved sustained any serious injuries .
The first tactical employment of Marine parachutists came with the large-scale landing exercis e of the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, in Augus t 1941 . This corps, under the command of Majo r General Holland M. Smith, consisted of the 1s t Marine Division and the Army's 1st Infantry Division . The final plan for the exercise at Ne w River, North Carolina, called for Captain Williams ' company to parachute at H plus 1 hour onto a vital crossroads behind enemy lines, secure it, an d then attack the rear of enemy forces opposing th e landing of the 1st Infantry Division . Captai n Howard's company would jump on the morning of D plus 2 in support of an amphibious landin g by Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A . Edson's Mobile Landing Group and a Marine tank company. Edson's force (the genesis of the 1st Raide r Battalion) would go ashore behind enemy lines , advance inland, destroy the opposing reserve force, and seize control of important lines of communication . Howard's men would land nea r Edson's objective and "secure the road net an d bridges in that vicinity . "
For the exercise the parachutists were attached to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which operate d from a small airfield at New Bern, North Carolina , just north of the Marine base . The landing forc e executed the operation as planned, but Holland Smith was not pleased with the results becaus e there were far too many artificialities, including the lack of an aggressor force . A shortage o f transport planes (only two on hand) handicappe d the parachutists ; it took several flights, with lon g delays between, to get just one of the understrength companies on the ground . Once the exercise was underway, Smith made one attemp t to simulate an enemy force . He arranged fo r Captain Williams to re-embark one squad an d jump behind the lines of the two divisions, wit h orders to create as much havoc as possible . Williams' tiny force cut tactical telephone lines , hijacked trucks, blocked a road, and successfull y evaded capture for several hours . One afteraction report noted that "the introduction of paratroops lent realism to the necessity for comman d post security . "
Smith put great faith in the potential value o f airborne operations . In his preliminary report o n the exercise, he referred to Edson' s infantry/tank/parachute assault on D+2 as a "spearhead thrust around the hostile flank" an d emphasized the need in modern warfare for th e "speed and shock effect" of airborne and armo r units . With that in mind, he recommended that his two-division force include at least one "ai r attack brigade" of at least one parachute regiment and one air infantry regiment . (The term "ai r infantry" referred to ground troops landed b y transport aircraft .) He also urged the Marin e Corps to acquire the necessary transport planes . Despite this high-level plea, the Marine Corp s continued to go slowly with the parachute program . At the end of March 1942, the 1st Battalion finally stood up its third line company, but th e entire organization only had a total of 332 officer s and men, less than 60 percent of its table of organization strength (one of the lowest figures in th e division) . The 2d Battalion, still recovering fro m the loss of its first Company A, had barely 20 0 men .
Manpower and aircraft shortages and th e straightjacket of the parachute training pipelin e accounted for some of the bottleneck, but a lac k of enthusiasm for the idea at Headquarters als o appears to have taken hold . By contrast, the Corps had not conceived the original idea for th e raiders until mid-1941, but it had two full 800-ma n battalions in existence by March 1942 . The Marine Corps was not enthusiastic about the latte r force, either, but it expanded rapidly in large measure due to pressure from President Frankli n Roosevelt and senior Navy leaders . Without similar heat from above, Headquarters was not abou t to commit its precious resources to a crash program to expand the parachutists and provid e them with air transports . Marine planners probably made a realistic choice in the matter, given th e competing requirements to fill up divisions an d air wings and make them ready for amphibiou s warfare, another infant art suffering through eve n greater growing pains .
Rendezvous at Gavutu
After four months of war, the 1st Marine Division was alerted to its first prospect of action . The vital Samoan Islands appeared to be next o n the Japanese invasion list and the Navy calle d upon the Marines to provide the necessary reinforcements for the meager garrison . In March 1942, Headquarters created two brigades for th e mission, cutting a regiment and a slice of sup -porting forces from each of the two Marine diviNew Zealand, where everyone assumed the divisions . The 7th Marines got the nod at New River sion would have months to complete the proces s and became the nucleus of the 3d Brigade . That of turning raw manpower into well-trained units . force initially included Edson's 1st Raider Part of the division shoved off from Norfolk in Battalion, but no paratroopers . In the long run May. Some elements, including Companies B and that was a plus for the 1st Parachute Battalion, C of the parachutists, took trains to the West Coas t which remained relatively untouched as the and boarded naval transports there on 19 June . brigade siphoned off much of the best manpowThe rest of the 1st Parachute Battalion was part o f er and equipment of the division to bring itself to a later Norfolk echelon, which set sail for Ne w full readiness . The division already was reeling Zealand on 10 June . from the difficult process of wartime expansion .
While the parachutists were still at sea, th e In the past few months it had absorbed thousands advance echelon of the division had already bedof newly minted Marines, subdivided units to creded down in New Zealand . But the 1st Marin e ate new ones, given up some of its best assets to Division's commander, Major General Alexande r field the raiders and parachutists, and built up a A . Vandegrift, received a rude shock shortly after base and training areas from the pine forests of he and his staff settled into their headquarters a t New River, North Carolina .
a Wellington hotel . He and his outfit were slated The parachutists and the remainder of the divito invade and seize islands in the southern sion did not have long to wait for their own call Solomons group on 1 August, just five week s to arms, however . In early April, Headquarters hence . To complicate matters, there was very litalerted the 1st Marine Division that it would begin tle solid intelligence about the objectives . Ther e movement overseas in May. The destination was were no maps on hand, so the division had to create its own from poor aerial photos an d sketches hand-drawn by former planters and traders familiar with the area . Planners estimated that there were about 5,27 5 enemy on Guadalcanal (home to a Japanese airfield under construction) and a total of 1,850 o n Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo . Tulagi, 17 mile s north of Guadalcanal, was valuable for its anchorage and seaplane base . The islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo, joined by a causeway, hosted a seaplane base and Japanese shore installations and menaced the approaches to Tulagi . In reality , there were probably 536 men on GavutuTanambogo, most of them part of construction o r aviation support units, though there was at least one platoon of the 3d Kure Special Naval Landing Force, the ground combat arm of the Imperial Navy . The list of heavy weapons on GavutuTanambogo included two three-inch guns and a n assortment of antiaircraft and antitank guns an d machine guns .
By the time the last transports docked in Ne w Zealand on 11 July, planners had outlined the operation and the execution date had slipped t o 7 August to allow the division a chance to gathe r its far-flung echelons and combat load transports . Five battalions of the 1st and 5th Marines woul d land on the large island of Guadalcanal at 0800 o n 7 August and seize the unfinished airfield on th e north coast . The 1st Raider Battalion, slated t o meet the division on the way to the objective , would simultaneously assault Tulagi . The 2 d Battalion, 5th Marines, would follow in trace an d support the raiders . The 2d Marines, also scheduled to rendezvous with the division at sea , would serve as the reserve force and land 20 minutes prior to H-Hour on Florida Island, thought t o be undefended . The parachutists received th e mission of attacking Gavutu at H plus four hours . The delay resulted from the need for planes , ships, and landing craft to concentrate first in support of the Tulagi operation . Once the paraMarine Parachute Pioneers I n October 1940, the Commandant sent a circula r letter to all units and posts to solicit volunteers for the paratroopers . All applicants, with the exception of officers above the rank of captain, had to meet a number of requirements regarding age (21 to 3 2 years), height (66 to 74 inches), and health (norma l eyesight and blood pressure) . In addition, they had to be unmarried, an indication of the expected hazards of the duty . Applications were to include information on the Marine's educational record and athletic experience, so Headquarters was obviously interested in placing above-average individuals i n these new units .
The letter further stated that personnel qualified a s parachutists would receive an unspecified amount of extra pay . The money served as both a recognitio n of the danger and an incentive to volunteer . Congress would eventually set the additional monthly pay for parachutists at $100 for officers and $50 fo r enlisted men . Since a private first class at that time earned about $36 per month and a second lieutenan t $125, the increase amounted to a hefty bonus . It would prove to be a significant factor in attractin g volunteers, though parachuting would have generated a lot of interest without the money . As one earl y applicant later put it, based on common knowledg e of the German success in the Low Countries, man y Marines thought "that this was going to be a grand and glorious business ." Parachute duty promised "plenty of action" and the chance to get in on th e ground floor of a revolutionary type of warfare .
To get the program underway, the Commandan t transferred Marine Captain Marion L . Dawson fro m duty with the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics to Lakehurst, New Jersey, to oversee the new school . Two enlisted Marine parachute riggers would serve as his initial assistants . Marine parachuting got off to an inauspicious start when Captain Dawson and two lieutenants made a visit to Hightstown, New Jersey , to check out the jumping towers . The other officers , Second Lieutenants Walter S . Osipoff and Robert C . McDonough, were slated to head the Corps' firs t group of parachute trainees . After watching a brief demonstration, the owner suggested that the Marine s give it a test . As Dawson later recalled, he "reluctantly" agreed, only to break his leg when he lande d at the end of his free fall .
On 26 October 1940, Osipoff, McDonough, and 38 enlisted men reported to Lakehurst . The Corps wa s still developing its training program, so the initial class spent 10 days at Hightstown starting on 2 8 October. Immediately after that they joined a ne w class at the Parachute Materiel School and followe d that 16-week course of instruction until its completion on 27 February 1941 . A Douglas R3D-2 transport plane arrived from Quantico on 6 December an d troopers secured Gavutu, they would move on t o its sister . The Tulagi, Gavutu-Tanambogo, an d Florida operations fell under the immediate control of a task force designated as the Northern Group, headed by Brigadier General William H . Rupertus, the assistant division commander .
After a feverish week of unloading, sorting , and reloading equipment and supplies, the parachutists boarded the transport USS Heywood o n 18 July and sailed in convoy to Koro Island in th e Fijis, where the entire invasion force conducte d landing rehearsals on 28 and 30 July . These went poorly, since the Navy boat crews and most of the 1st Marine Division were too green . The parachute battalion was better trained than most of the division, but this was its very first experience as a unit in conducting a seaborne landing . There is no indication that planners gave any thought t o using their airborne capability, though in all likelihood that was due to the lack of transport aircraft or the inability of available planes to make a round-trip flight from New Zealand to th e Solomons .
The parachutists had the toughest mission in many respects . With a grand total of eight smal l infantry platoons, they had just 361 Marines , much less than half the manpower of other lin e battalions . More important, they lacked th e punch of heavy mortars and machine guns and had fewer of the light versions of these weapons , too . Even their high proportion of individua l automatic weapons would not help much ; many of these were the unreliable Reising submachine gun . The late hour of their attack also sacrifice d any element of surprise, though planners assumed that naval and aerial firepower woul d suppress Japanese defenders . Nor was terrain i n their favor . The coral reef surrounding the islets meant that the only suitable landing site was th e boat basin on the northeast coast of Gavutu, bu t that point was subject to flanking fire fro m defenders on Tanambogo . In addition, a steep remained there through the 21st, so the pioneer Marine paratroopers made their first jumps during this period . For the remainder of the course, the y leapt from Navy blimps stationed at Lakehurst. Lieutenant Osipoff, the senior officer, had the honor of making the first jump by a Marine paratrooper. By graduation, each man had completed the requisite 10 jumps to qualify as a parachutist and parachute rigger. Not all made it through-several dropped fro m the program due to ineptitude or injury . The majority of these first graduates were destined to remain a t Lakehurst as instructors or to serve the units in th e Fleet Marine Force as riggers .
By the time the second training class reported , Dawson and his growing staff had created a syllabus for the program. The first two weeks were groun d school, which emphasized conditioning, wearing o f the harness, landing techniques, dealing with win d drag of the parachute once on the ground, jumping from platforms and a plane mockup, and packing chutes . Students spent the third week riding a bus each day to Hightstown where they applied thei r skills on the towers . The final two weeks consiste d of work from aircraft and tactical training as time permitted. Students had to complete six jumps to qualify as a parachutist . The trainers had accumulate d their knowledge from the Navy staff, from observin g Army training at Fort Benning, and from a film depicting German parachutists . The latter resulted in one significant Marine departure from U .S. Army methods . Whereas the Army made a vertical exit from the aircraft, basically just stepping out the door, Marines copied the technique depicted in the German film and tried to make a near-perpendicula r dive, somewhat like a swimmer coming off the starting block .
Marine paratroopers used two parachutes in training and in tactical jumps. They wore the main chute in a backpack configuration and a reserve chute o n their chest . When jumping from transport planes, the main opened by means of a static line attached to a cable running lengthwise in the cargo compartment . Once the jumpmaster gave the signal, a ma n crouched in the doorway, made his exit dive, and then drew his knees toward his chest . The parachutist, arms wrapped tightly about his chest chute , felt the opening shock of his main canopy almos t immediately upon leaving the plane . If not, he ha d to pull the ripcord to deploy the reserve chute . (When jumping from blimps, the parachutists had t o use a ripcord for the main chute, too .) A parachutist's speed of descent depended upon his weight , so Marines carried as little as possible to keep the rate down near 16 feet per second, the equivalent o f jumping from a height of about 10 feet . At that spee d a jumper had to fall and roll when hitting the groun d so as to spread the shock beyond his leg joints . Training jumps began at 1,000 feet, while the standard height for tactical jumps in the Corps was 75 0 feet . The Germans jumped from as low as 300 feet , but that made it impossible to open the emergenc y chute in time for it to be effective . The canopy fills out as a jumper is released fro m the fly-away tower at Hightstown, New Jersey, i n 1941 . This 150 foot tower was a copy of one used as an amusement ride at the New York World's Fair the previous year.
coral hill dominated the flat coastal area of eac h islet . Finally, despite a rule of thumb that th e attackers should outnumber defenders by three t o one in an amphibious assault, they were going u p against a significantly larger enemy force . The parachutists' only advantage was their high level of training and esprit .
The U .S . task force sailed into the waters between Guadalcanal and Florida Island in the pre-dawn darkness of 7 August 1942 . Planes and 8 rose into the sky and most Marines assumed that clambered from their landing craft onto the doc k few could survive such a pounding, but the disagainst little opposition . The Japanese quickly play of firepower probably produced few casualrecovered and soon opened up with heavier fir e ties among the defenders, who had long since that stopped Company A's advance toward Hil l sought shelter innumerous caves and dugouts .
148 after the Marines had progressed just 75 The bombardment did destroy one three-inch yards . Enemy gunners also devoted some of thei r gun on Gavutu, as well as the seaplane ramp the attention to the two succeeding waves and inflictparachutists had hoped to land on, thus forcing ed casualties as they made the long approac h the Higgins boats to divert to a nearby pier or a around Gavutu to reach the northern shore . small beach . While the parachutists awaited this assistance , Company B and a few men from Company A continued to attack Hill 148 from its eastern flank . Individuals and small groups worked from dugou t to dugout under rifle and machine gun fire from the enemy . Learning from initial experience , Marines began to tie demolition charges of TNT t o long boards and stuff them into the entrances . That prevented the enemy from throwing bac k the explosives and it permanently put the positions out of action . Captain Harry L . Torgerso n and Corporal Johnnie Blackan distinguishe d themselves in this effort . Other men, such as Sergeant Max Koplow and Corporal Ralph W. Fordyce, took a more direct approach and entered the bunkers with submachine guns blazing . Platoon Sergeant Harry M . Tully used hi s marksmanship skill and Johnson rifle to pick off a number of Japanese snipers . The parachutists go t their 60mm mortars into action, too, and use d them against Japanese positions on the uppe r slopes of Hill 148 . By 1430, the eastern half of th e island was secure, but enemy fire fro m Tanambogo kept the parachutists from overrunning the western side of the hill .
In the course of the afternoon, the Nav y responded to Miller's call for support . Dive bombers worked over Tanambogo, then tw o destroyers closed on the island and thoroughl y shelled it . In the midst of this action, one pilot mistakenly dropped his ordnance on Gavutu' s hilltop and inflicted several casualties o n Company B . By 1800, the battalion succeeded i n raising the U .S . flag at the summit of Hill 148 and physically occupying the remainder of Gavutu . With the suppression of fire from Tanambogo and
Colonel Robert H. Williams commanded the 1s t Parachute Battalion for much of its early life, taking charge at its inception and leading it into its first battle at Gavutu . He later served as commander of the 1st Parachute Regimeni during most of that outfit's 10 months of existence .
Department of Defense (USMC) A40072 1 the cover of night, the parachutists collected thei r casualties, to include Major Williams, and began evacuating the wounded to the transports . Ground reinforcements arrived more slowl y than fire support . Company B, 1st Battalion, 2 d Marines, reported to Miller on Gavutu at 1800 . H e ordered them to make an amphibious landing o n Tanambogo and arranged for preparatory fire b y a destroyer. The parachutists also would support the move with their fire and Company C woul d attack across the causeway after the landing . Miller, perhaps buoyed by the late afternoo n decrease in enemy fire from Tanambogo, was certain that the fresh force would carry the day . For his part, the Company B commander left th e meeting under the impression that there were 
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only a few snipers left on the island . The attac k ran into trouble from the beginning and th e Marine force ended up withdrawing under heav y fire .
During the night, the parachutists dealt with Japanese emerging from dugouts or swimming ashore from Tanambogo or Florida . A heavy rain helped conceal these attempts at infiltration, bu t the enemy accomplished little . At 2200, General Rupertus requested additional forces to seiz e Tanambogo and the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines , went ashore on Gavutu late in the morning on 8 August . They took over many of the position s facing Tanambogo and in the afternoon launche d an amphibious attack of one company supporte d by three tanks . Another platoon followed up the landing by attacking across the causeway . Bitte r fighting ensued and the 3d Battalion did not completely secure Tanambogo until 9 August . This outfit suffered additional casualties on 8 Augus t when yet another Navy dive bomber mistoo k Gavutu for Tanambogo and struck Hill 148 .
In the first combat operation of an America n parachute unit, the battalion had suffered sever e losses : 28 killed and about 50 wounded, nearly al l of the latter requiring evacuation . The dea d included four officers and 11 NCOs . The casualty rate of just over 20 percent was by far the highest of any unit in the fighting to secure the initia l lodgement in the Guadalcanal area . (The raiders were next in line with roughly 10 percent.) The Japanese force defending Gavutu-Tanambog o was nearly wiped out, with only a handful surrendering or escaping to Florida Island . Despite the heavy odds the parachutists had faced, they had proved more than equal to the faith placed i n their capabilities and had distinguished themselves in a very tough fight . In addition to raw courage, they had displayed the initiative an d resourcefulness required to deal with a determined and cunning enemy .
On the night of 8 August, a Japanese surfac e force arrived from Rabaul and surprised the Allie d naval forces guarding the transports . In a brief engagement the enemy sank four cruisers and a destroyer, damaged other ships, and killed 1,20 0 sailors, all at minimal cost to themselves . The American naval commander had little choice th e next morning but to order the early withdrawal of his force . Most of the transports would depart that afternoon with their cargo holds half full , leaving the Marines short of food, ammunition, and equipment . The parachutists suffered an additional loss that would make life even more miserable for them . They had landed on 7 August with just their weapons, ammunition, and a twoday supply of C and D rations . They had placed their extra clothing, mess gear, and other essentia l field items into individual rolls and loaded the m on a landing craft for movement to the beach after they secured the islands . As the parachutist s fought on shore, Navy personnel decided the y needed to clear out the boat, so they uncomprehendingly tossed all the gear into the sea . Th e battalion ended its brief association with Gavut u on the afternoon of 9 August and shifted to a bivouac site on Tulagi .
Tasimboko
As August progressed it became clear that th e Japanese were focusing their effort in th e Solomons on regaining the vital airfield o n Guadalcanal . The enemy poured fresh troops onto the island via the "Tokyo Express," a shuttl e of ships and barges coming down the "the Slot " each night . The 1st Marines destroyed the newl y landed Ichiki Detachment along the Tenaru Rive r on 21 August, but the understrength Marine division had too few troops to secure the entir e perimeter. To bolster his force, Genera l Vandegrift brought the raiders over from Tulagi at the end of August and switched the parachutists a few days later . The two battalions went into reserve in a coconut grove near Lunga Point . During this period Major Miller took ill and went into the field hospital, as did other parachutists . The shrinking battalion, temporarily commande d by a captain and down to less than 300 effectives , was so depleted in numbers and senior leadership that Vandegrift decided to attach them to Edson' s 1st Raider Battalion . The combined unit roughl y equalled the size of a standard infantry battalion , though it still lacked the heavy firepower.
Following the arrival of the first aviation reinforcements on 20 August, the division made us e Marine Corps Airborne Doctrin e O n 15 May 1940 the Commandant, Major General Thomas Holcomb, wrote the Chief of Nava l Operations to seek the help of his naval attaches i n gathering information on foreign parachute programs . He noted that he was "intensely interested" in the subject. The Berlin attache responded the following month with a lead on how to obtain newsreels and an educational film on the German paratroopers . The London attache eventually provide d additional information on the Germans and o n Britain's fledgling parachute program launched i n June 1940.
The Commandant's own intelligence section ha d already compiled available material on the Germa n and Soviet forces . The report noted the distinctio n between parachutists and air infantry, the latter consisting of specially organized units trained and equipped to move by transport aircraft . The paratroopers acted as the advance guard for the air infantry by seizing the airfields upon which the transports would land . The report also detailed the different methods that the Germans and Soviets used t o train their respective forces . German paratrooper recruits went through an intensive ground school prior to making the six jumps required to achiev e membership in a unit . The Soviet program featured the use of towers for practice jumps prior to actual training with a plane . When staff officers a t Headquarters first looked at parachute forces in the aftermath of Eben Emael, they specifically considered the functions such a unit would perform . Their idea s were generally similar : paratroopers would be valuable for raids, reconnaissance, the seizure of airfields, aerial envelopment of the enemy's rear area, and th e occupation of key terrain in advance of the mai n force . Several officers specifically tied the latter two missions to the conduct of amphibious operations .
Although the Corps' amphibious doctrine had existed on paper for several years, the Fleet Marin e Force was having a difficult time turning those ideas into reality. During annual exercises, a lack of decen t landing craft and transports had prevented the rapi d buildup ashore of combat power, something the amphibious force had to do if it hoped to defea t counterattacks against its beachhead. Brigadie r General Holland M . Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Brigade, first tried to solve this problem during Fleet Exercise 6 in February 1940 . A key part of his plan was the night landing of one company thre e hours prior to the main amphibious assault . This company, embarked in a fast destroyer transport, would go ashore by rubber boat, seize key terrain overlooking the proposed beachhead, and then protect the rest of the force as it landed and got itsel f of its daytime control of the skies to launch a number of seaborne operations . Near the end o f the month, a battalion of the 5th Marines conducted an amphibious spoiling attack on Japanes e forces to the west of the perimeter, but inflicted little damage due to a lack of aggressive leadership . Two companies of raiders found no enem y after scouring Savo Island on 4 September, whil e a mixup in communications scrubbed a simila r foray scheduled the next day for Cape Esperance . By 6 September, Japanese naval activity and native scouting reports indicated that the enemy was concentrating fresh troops near the village of Tasimboko, located on the coast several miles east of the Marine lines .
Edson and Lieutenant Colonel Gerald C . Thomas, the division operations officer, hatched a plan to raid this eastern terminus of the Toky o Express on 8 September. Intelligence initially placed two or three hundred Japanese a t Tasimboko, with their defenses located west of the village and facing toward Henderson Field .
Edson planned to land to the east of the villag e and attack them from the rear. The availabl e shipping consisted of two destroyer transport s (APDs) and two small, converted tuna boats, so the raider commander divided his force into two waves . The raider rifle companies would embar k on the evening of 7 September and land just prior to dawn, then the tiny fleet would shuttle back t o the perimeter to pick up the weapons company and the parachutists . Since the APDs were needed for other missions, the Marine force would have to complete its work and reembark the same day . (The Navy had already lost three of the original six APDs in the Guadalcanal campaign . )
On the evening of 7 September, native scouts brought news that the enemy force at Tasimbok o had swelled to several thousand . Division planners discounted these reports, believing that the y were greatly exaggerated or referred to remnants of previously defeated formations . When the raiders landed at 0520 on the 8th, they immediately realized that the natives had provided accuorganized . This idea eventually gave birth to the 1s t Marine Raider Battalion . In the spring of 1940, it was obvious to a number of Marine officers, a t Headquarters and in the FMF, that parachutists no w constituted an ideal alternative for speedily seizing a surprise lodgement on an enemy coast . Smith explicitly would advocate that new wrinkle to doctrine th e following year.
The Marine Corps did not develop formal airborn e doctrine until late 1942 . It came in the form of a 12-page manual titled Parachute and Air Troops. Its authors believed that airborne forces could constitut e "a paralyzing application of power in the initial phas e of a landing attack ." Secondarily, parachute troops could seize "critical points," such as airfields or bridges, or they could operate behind enemy lines in small groups to gather intelligence or conduct sabotage operations . The doctrine noted the limitations of airborne assault and emphasized that these force s could only seize small objectives and hold them for a short time pending linkup with seaborne or overlan d echelons . The manual envisioned the formation of an air brigade composed of one regiment each of paratroops and air infantry, the type of force originally sought by Holland Smith .
The doctrinal publication did not provide much detail on tactics, but the parachutists worked ou t techniques in combination with Marine transpor t pilots . The standard method of operations called for a terrain-hugging approach flight at altitudes as lo w as 50 feet, with a last-minute ascent to several hundred feet, at which point the jumpers exited the aircraft . All leaders were thoroughly briefed beforehand with maps, aerial photos, and a sandtable mockup o f the objective, so that they could quickly get organized and oriented once they hit the ground . When they jumped, the paratroopers carried the collapsibl e Johnson weapons or Reisings, along with basic individual items such as a belt, knife, canteens, and ammunition. Cargo parachutes delivered heavie r weapons and supplies .
From early in the life of the program, planners realized that a lack of training facilities and plane s hampered the ability of the Corps to field an adequate airborne force . They thus began looking at using parachutists for secondary missions . In April 1941 the Commandant directed that parachute units conduct training in rubber boat operations, reconnaissance, demolitions, and other subjects to enabl e them to conduct special missions requiring only small forces or not necessarily involving airborne insertion . On New Caledonia in 1943, the 1st Parachut e Regiment devoted much of its training time to suc h skills . In many respects the Marine Corps had molded the parachutists and raiders into carbon copies of each other, with the parachutists' unique ability t o enter battle being the only significant difference between the two special units . rate information . Not far from the beach, Marine s discovered endless rows of neatly placed life preservers, a large number of foxholes, and several unattended 37mm antitank guns . Luckily fo r Edson's outfit, Major General Kiyotake Kawaguch i and his brigade of more than 3,000 men alread y had departed into the interior . Only a rear guar d of 300 soldiers remained behind to secure th e Japanese base at Tasimboko, but even that small force was nearly as large as the first wave o f raiders .
Company D of the raiders (little more than a platoon in strength) remained at the landing beach as rear security while the other companies moved west toward Tasimboko . The raiders soo n ran into stubborn resistance, with the Japanese firing artillery over open sights directly at the advancing Marines . Edson sent one compan y wide to the left to flank the defenders . As the action developed, the APDs Manley and McKea n returned to Kukum Beach at 0755 and the Parachute Battalion (less Company C) debarke d within 25 minutes . The 208 parachutists joine d Company D ashore by 1130 and went into defensive positions adjacent to them. Edson, fearing that he might be moving into a Japanese trap , already had radioed division twice and asked fo r reinforcements, to include another landing to the west of Tasimboko in what was now the enemy rear . In reply, division ordered the raiders an d parachutists to withdraw . Edson persisted, however, and Japanese resistance melted away abou t noon . The raider assault echelon entered the village and discovered a stockpile of food, ammunition, and weapons ranging up to 75mm artiller y pieces . The raider and parachute rear guar d closed up on the main force and the Marines set about destroying the enemy supply base . Three hours later the combined unit began to reembar k and all were back in the division perimeter by nightfall .
The raid was a minor tactical victory with majo r operational impact on the Guadalcanal campaign . At a cost of two killed and six wounded, the Marines had killed 27 Japanese . The enemy suffered more grievously in terms of lost firepower, logistics, and communication. Intelligence gathered at the scene also revealed some details abou t the coming Japanese offensive . These latter facts would allow the 1st Marine Division to fight of f one of the most serious challenges to its tenuou s hold on Henderson Field .
Edson's Ridge
On 9 September, Edson met with division planners to discuss the results of the raid . Intelligenc e officers translating captured documents indicate d that up to 3,000 Japanese were cutting their way through the jungle southwest of Tasimboko . Edson was convinced that they planned to attac k the unguarded southern portion of the perimeter. From an aerial photograph he picked out a grasscovered ridge that pointed like a knife at the airfield . He based his hunch on his experience with the Japanese and in jungle operations i n Nicaragua . Lieutenant Colonel Thomas agreed . Vandegrift, just in the process of moving his command post into that area, was reluctant to accep t a conclusion that would force him to move ye t again . After much discussion, he allowed Thomas to shift the bivouac of the raiders and parachutist s to the ridge to get them out of the pattern o f bombs falling around the airfield .
The combined force moved to the new location on 10 September and quickly discovered tha t it was not the rest area they had hoped to enjoy . enemy aircraft bombed the ridge on the 11th an d 12th, inflicting several casualties . Native scouts reported the progress of the Japanese column and Marine patrols confirmed the presence of strong enemy forces to the southeast of the perimeter . The raiders and parachutists found the process o f constructing defensive positions tough going . There was very little barbed wire and no sandbags or heavy tools . Men digging in on the ridg e itself found coral just below the shallow surfac e soil . Units disposed in the flanking jungle wer e hampered by the thick growth, which reduce d fields of fire to nothing . Both units were smaller than ever, as tropical illnesses, poor diet, and lack of sleep combined to swell the number of men in the field hospital . Those still listed as effectiv e often were just barely so .
Edson faced a tough situation as he contemplated how to defend the ridge area . Several hundred yards to the right of his coral hogback wa s the Lunga River ; beyond it, elements of the 1st Pioneer and 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalions had strongpoints . More than a mile to his left wa s the tail end of the 1st Marine Regiment's position s along the Tenaru River. With the exception of th e kunai grass-covered slopes of the ridge, everything else was dense jungle . His small force , about the size of a single infantry battalion bu t lacking all the heavy weapons, could not possibl y establish a classic linear defense . Edson place d the parachutists on the east side of the ridge, with Company B holding a line running from the slop e of Hill 80 into the jungle . The other two companies echeloned to the rear to hold the left flank . Company B of the raiders occupied the righ t slope of Hill 80 and anchored their right on a lagoon . Company C placed platoon strongpoints between the lagoon and river. The remaining raiders were in reserve near Hill 120 . Thomas moved 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, into positio n between the ridge and the airfield and reoriente d some of his artillery to fire to the south . Artillery forward observers joined Edson's command pos t on the front slope of Hill 120 and registered the guns .
Kawaguchi's Brigade faced its own troubles a s it fought through the jungle and over the numerous slimy ridges . The rough terrain had force d the Japanese to leave behind their artillery an d most of their supplies . Their commander als o detailed one of his four battalions to make a diversionary attack along the Tenaru, which lef t him with just 2,500 men for the main assault . To make matters worse, the Japanese had underestimated the jungle and fallen behind schedule . A s the sun set on 12 September, Kawaguchi realize d that only one battalion was in its assembly are a and none of his units had been able to reconnoiter their routes of attack . The Japanese genera l tried to delay the jumpoff scheduled for 2200, bu t he could not contact his battalions . Withou t guides and running late, the attack blundered forward in darkness and soon degenerated into confusion .
At the appointed hour, a Japanese float plan e dropped green flares over the Marine positions . A cruiser and three destroyers began shelling th e ridge area and kept up the bombardment for 2 0 minutes, though few rounds landed on their intended target ; many sailed over the ridge into the jungle beyond . Japanese infantry followed up with their own flares and began to launch thei r assault . The enemy's confusion may have benefited the parachute battalion, since all the action occurred on the raider side of the position . The enemy never struck the ridge proper, but did dislodge the Company C raiders, who fell back and eventually regrouped near Hill 120 . At daylight the Japanese broke off the attack and tried to reorganize for another attempt the next night .
In Kawaguchi renewed his attack right after darkness fell on the 13th . His first blow struck the right flank of the raiders' Company B and drove Air Transport T he fate of the parachute program was intertwined completely with Marine aviation, inasmuch as the airborne infantry could not fulfill it s function without transport aircraft . Although me n could jump from just about any type of plane, tactical parachute operations required certain characteristics in aircraft . The door had to allow easy exit an d the interior freedom of movement so that a stick of jumpers could exit the plane in short order; the ideal was one second per man. Any increase in the delay between jumpers resulted in wide dispersion once the stick landed on the ground and that translate d into extra time spent in finding weapons and gettin g organized to fight. The last parachutists also migh t find themselves landing outside the drop zone i n woods or water, either of which could easily resul t in death or serious injury.
When Headquarters planners first began evaluating the idea of creating Marine parachute units, th e Corps possessed just two planes suitable for tactica l jumping, the pair of R2D-ls of Utility Squadron 1 (VMJ-1) in Quantico, Virginia . The R2D-1 was a military version of the Douglas DC-2 airliner . Its two Wright engines generated 710 horsepower, lifted th e plane's maximum gross weight of 18,200 pounds , and pushed it to a top speed of 210 miles per hour. It could accommodate approximately 10 parachutists . (The capacity depended, of course, upo n the amount of equipment to be dropped, since eac h cargo parachute for weapons and supplies took u p the space of one man .) At that time the Department of the Navy had on order seven of Douglas' newer DC-5s, known as R3D-2s in the naval services . The Marine Corps was slated to receive four of these aircraft, which could hold about 15 jumpers . The Corps had its R3D-2s by mid-1941 and placed tw o each in VMJ-252 and 152, respectively located i n Hawaii and Quantico. One of the old R2D-l s remained in service at the air station in San Diego .
The real workhorse of Allied airborne operations during World War II was based on Douglas' DC-3 airliner, which made its first commercial flight in 1935 . The Army Air Forces began buying a military versio n in 1940 and labelled it the C-47 . The Department o f the Navy acquired its first planes of this type, designated the R4D, during 1942 . The Skytrain's two Pratt and Whitney engines generated 1,200 horsepower , lifted the plane's gross weight of 29,000 pounds, an d pushed it to a top speed of 227 miles per hour . I t could carry up to 25 paratroopers out to a range o f 1,600 miles . The United States built over 10,000 C -47 variants during the war, with the naval service s receiving 568 of them . In August 1943 the Marin e Corps possessed about 80 of these planes . Ther e were seven VMJ squadrons and an eighth on th e drawing board, each with a projected authorizatio n of one dozen R4Ds, but most of the units were bran d new and still short of planes and crews . A numbe r of the aircraft also were distributed in ones or two s to headquarters squadrons in support of various ai r groups . The heart of Marine transport capabilit y rested at that point in Marine Air Group 25's three squadrons in the South Pacific, a grand total of jus t 36 tranpsorts . on his right . To add to the confusion, Marine s thought they heard shouts of "gas attack" a s smoke rose up from the lower reaches of th e ridge . Duryea's small force ended up next t o Company C in the draw on the east slope, wher e he reported to Torgerson, now the battalion executive officer. The units were clustered in lowlying ground and had no contact on their flanks . Torgerson ordered both companies to withdra w to the rear of Hill 120, where he hoped to reorganize them in the lee of the reserve line and th e masking terrain . Given the collapse of the fron t line, it was a reasonable course of action .
The withdrawal of the parachutists left th e rump of the raiders, perhaps 60 men, all alone i n the center of the old front line . Edson arrange d for covering fire from the artillery and the troop s around Hill 120, then ordered Company B back t o the knoll . There they joined the reserve line , which was now the new front line . This series o f rearward movements threatened to degenerat e into a rout . Night movements under fire are always confusing and commanders no longer ha d positive control of coherent units . There was no neat line of fighting holes to occupy, no time t o hold muster and sort out raiders from parachutist s and get squads, platoons, and companies bac k together again . A few men began to filter to the rear of the hill, while others lay prone waiting fo r direction . Edson, with his command post now in the middle of the front line, took immediat e action . The raider commander ordered Torgerso n to lead his Companies B and C from the rear o f the hill and lengthen the line running from the lef t of Company A's position . Edson then made it known that this would be the final stand, that n o
Trainees at Lakehurst sit on the floor of their transport waiting for the signal to prepare to jump . Given the number of jumpers and their seating
one was authorized to retreat another step . Major Kenneth D . Bailey, commander of the Company C raiders, played a major role in revitalizing th e defenders . He moved along the line of mingle d raiders and parachutists, encouraging everyon e and breathing new life into those on the verge o f giving up .
Under the direction of Torgerson and unit leaders, the two parachute companies in reserve moved forward in a skirmish line and establishe d contact on the flank of their fellows fro m Company A. They met only "slight resistance" i n the process, but soon came under heavy attack a s the Japanese renewed their assault on the hill . Edson later thought that this action "succeeded in breaking up a threatening hostile envelopment o f our position" and "was a decisive factor in ou r ultimate victory ." The new line of raiders an d parachutists was not very strong, just a small Photo courtesy of Anderson PC826 arrangement, this appears to be an R3D-2, th e Marine Corps variant of the Douglas DC-5 civilia n aircraft .
horseshoe bent around the bare slopes of the knoll, with troops from the two battalions stil l intermingled in many spots . The artillery kept u p a steady barrage-"the most intensive concentration of the campaign" according to the division' s final report . And all along the line, Marines thre w grenade after grenade to support the fire of thei r automatic weapons . Supplies of ammunitio n dwindled rapidly and moving cases of grenade s and belted machine gun rounds to the frontlin e became a key element of the fight .
At 0400, Edson asked division to commit th e reserve battalion to bolster his depleted forces . One company at a time, the men of the 2 d Battalion, 5th Marines, moved along the spine of the ridge and into place beside those who ha d survived the long night. By dawn the Japanes e had exhausted their reservoir of fighting spirit and Kawaguchi admitted defeat in the face of a tena -cious defense backed by superior firepower. Th e enemy began to break contact and retreat , although a number of small groups and individuals remained scattered through the jungle on th e flanks and in the rear of the Marine position . Th e men of the 2d Battalion began the long process o f rooting out these snipers, while Edson ordered u p an air strike to hasten the departure of the main Japanese force . A flight of P-40s answered th e call and strafed the enemy infantry still clinging t o the exposed forward slopes of Hill 80 . Th e raiders and parachutists walked off the ridge tha t morning and returned to their previous bivouac i n the coconut grove . Although an accurate count o f Japanese bodies was impossible, the division estimated there were some 700 dead sprawle d around the small battlefield . Of Kawaguchi's 50 0 wounded, few would survive the difficult tre k back to the coast .
The two-day battle on the ridge had cost th e 1st Raiders 135 men and the 1st Parachut e Battalion 128 . Of those totals, 59 were dead o r missing, including 15 parachutists killed in action . Many of the wounded parachutists would eventually return to duty, but for the moment the battalion was down to about 100 effectives, the equivalent of a severely under-strength rifle company . It was no longer a useful tactical entity and had seen its last action on Guadalcanal . Three days later, a convoy brought the 7th Marines to th e island and the remaining men of the 1st Parachute Battalion embarked in those ships for a voyage t o a welcome period of rest and recuperation in a rear area .
The parachute battalion had contributed a great deal to the successful prosecution of th e campaign . They had made the first America n amphibious assault of the war against a defende d beach and fought through the intense fire to secure the island . Despite their meager numbers , lack of senior leadership, and minimal firepower, they had stood with the raiders against difficult odds on the ridge . The 1st Marine Division's fina l report on Guadalcanal lauded that performance : "The actions and conduct of those who participated in the defense of the ridge is deserving of the warmest commendation . The troops engaged were tired, sleepless and battle weary at the outset . Throughout the night they held their positions in the face of powerful attacks by overwhelming numbers of the enemy . Driven from one position they reorganized and clung tenaciously to another until daylight found the enem y again in full flight ." Looking back on the campaign after the war, General Vandegrift would sa y that "I think the most crucial moment was th e Battle of the Ridge . "
Recuperation and Reevaluation
The 1st Parachute Battalion arrived in Ne w Caledonia and went into a "dreadful" transien t camp . For the next few weeks the area headquarters assigned the tired, sick men of th e orphaned unit to unload ships and work on construction projects . Luckily Lieutenant Colonel Williams returned to duty after recovering fro m his wound and took immediate steps to rectify th e situation . The battalion's last labor project wa s building its own permanent quarters, name d Camp Kiser after Second Lieutenant Walter W . Kiser, killed at Gavutu . The site was picturesque ; a grassy, undulating plain rising into low hills and overlooking the Tontouta River. Wooden structures housed the parachute loft and messhalls, but for the most part the officers and men lived and worked in tents . The two dozen transport plane s of VMJ-152 and VMJ-253 occupied a nearby airfield . The parachutists made a few conditionin g hikes while they built their camp and began serious training in November. The first order of business was reintroducing themselves to their primary specialty, since none of them had touched a parachute in many months . They practiced packing and jumping and graduated to tactical training emphasizing patrolling and jungle warfare .
The 1st Battalion received company on 1 1 January 1943, when the 2d Battalion arrived a t Tontouta and went into bivouac at Camp Kiser . The West Coast parachute outfit had continued to build itself up while its East Coast counterpart sailed with the 1st Marine Division and fought a t Guadalcanal . During the summer of 1942, the 2d Battalion had found enough aircraft in bus y southern California to make mass jumps with u p to 14 planes . (Though "mass" is a relative term here ; an entire battalion required about 50 R3D-2 s to jump at once .) The battalion also benefitted from its additional time in the States, as it receive d Johnson rifles and light machine guns in place of the reviled Reisings . However, the manpowe r pipeline was still slow, as Company C did no t come into being until 3 September 1942 (1 8 months after the first parachutists reported to Sa n
General Alexander A . Vandegrift, then commanding general of I Marine Amphibious Corps, review s a formal parade by parachutists at Camp Kiser o n 29 July 1943 . Unbeknownst to the marchers, they
Diego for duty) . The battalion sailed from San Diego in October 1942, arrived at Wellington , New Zealand in November, and departed for New Caledonia on 6 January 1943 .
As the 2d Battalion prepared to head overseas , it detached a cadre to form the 3d Parachut e Battalion, which officially came into existence o n 16 September 1942 . Compared to its older counterparts, the 3d Battalion grew like a weed an d reached full strength by the end of December. The battalion commander, Major Robert T . Vance , emphasized infantry tactics, demolition work , guerrilla warfare, and physical conditioning in addition to parachuting . At the beginning of 1943, the battalion simulated a parachute assault behind enemy lines in support of a practice amphibious landing by the 21st Marines on Sa n Clemente Island . The fully trained outfit sailed from San Diego in March and joined the 1st an d 2d Battalions at Camp Kiser before the end of the month .
At the end of 1942, the Marine Corps had transferred the parachute battalions from their respective divisions and made them a I Marine Department of Defense (USMC) 127-GW-371-5793 1 alrerady had executed their last training jump and Vandegrift would bring their organization to a n end less than five months later.
Amphibious Corps asset . This recognized thei r special training and unique mission and theoretically allowed them to withdraw from the battlefield and rebuild while the divisions remaine d engaged in extended land combat . After the 3 d Battalion arrived in New Caledonia in March 1943 , I MAC took the next logical step and created the 1st Parachute Regiment on 1 April . This fulfille d Holland Smith's original call for a regimental-size unit and provided for unified control of the battalions in combat and in training . Lieutenan t Colonel Williams became the first commandin g officer of the new organization .
Just when things appeared most promising for Marine parachuting, the Corps shifted into reverse gear. General Holcomb and planners at Headquarters had not shown much enthusiasm for th e program since mid-1940 and apparently began t o have strong second thoughts in the fall of 1942 . In October, Brigadier General Keller E . Rockey, the director of Plans and Policies at HQMC, ha d queried I MAC about the "use of parachutists" i n its geographic area . There is no record of a reply , but I MAC later sent Lieutenant Colonel William s 20 in a B-24 to make an aerial reconnaissance o f New Georgia in the Central Solomons for a potential airborne operation . In early 1943, I MA C dragged its feet on planning for the Central Solomons mission and the Navy eventually turne d to the Army's XIV Corps headquarters to cornmand the June invasion of New Georgia . In March, the Navy decided that Vandegrift would take over I MAC in July, with Thomas as his chie f of staff. They had suffered the loss of some of their best men to the parachute and raider programs during the difficult buildup of the 1s t
Training Centers
V ery early in the process of creating the parachute program, the Marine Corps sought out information on the parachute tower then being used as a n amusement ride at the New York City World's Fair. A lieutenant with the Marine Detachment at the fai r provided his report on 20 May 1940 . He though t such a tower could be used to advantage if the Corp s modified it to simulate the physical jolt that a jumpe r would experience when his parachute opened an d radically slowed his rate of descent . Safe Parachute Company, the builder of the World's Fair ride, als o owned two towers at Hightstown, New Jersey . Each stood 150 feet tall and used a large ring to lift a spread parachute with the jumper dangling from the risers . When the mechanism released its load, the descending chute automatically filled with air . One tower featured a controlled descent guided by fou r cables, while the other completely released the parachute for a free fall . Fortuitously, Hightstown wa s just 20 miles from the Navy's Parachute Materie l School at Naval Air Station Lakehurst, New Jersey, th e facility that trained sailors and a handful of Marines t o pack parachutes for pilots . That made Lakehurst the obvious choice as the primary instruction facility .
Lakehurst eventually had room to train a maximum of 100 men at a time . Given the length of the course (which often stretched to six weeks or more due to delays for weather), the Corps thus could produce no more than 700 qualified parachutists pe r year. By mid-1941 the school was not even achieving that pace, having fallen more than two month s behind schedule . In July 1941, the officer in charg e of the school recommended creation of an additional parachute training facility at the burgeoning Marin e base in New River, North Carolina, but it would b e awhile before the Corps found the resources to act o n that suggestion .
In the meantime, Headquarters decided to shift it s primary parachute school to San Diego to allow mor e efficient use of training time due to better weathe r and the proximity of Marine aviation units . In April The Marine Corps established another trainin g facility at New River's Hadnot Point during 1942 . I n June the 1st Parachute Battalion had transferred on e officer and 13 NCOs to form the instructor cadre . The school opened with a first class of 54 students on 10 August, but delays in constructing the jump towers and obtaining parachutes slowed training . The initial group finally graduated on 13 October . The New River school's designed capacity was 75 students per class, with a new class beginning every week. By the end of 1942 the Marine parachute program was finally in full swing and capable of producing 135 new jumpers per week, though actual numbers were never that high.
The Marine Corps had one more source of traine d parachutists . During the 1st Battalion's initial perio d of recuperation from fighting on Gavutu and Guadalcanal, it had difficulty obtaining qualifie d jumpers from the States . To solve the problem , Lieutenant Colonel Williams organized his own informal school . It lacked towers and he ignored much o f the syllabus used stateside, but during the program's brief operation it produced about 100 trained jumpers from volunteers garnered from other units located i n New Caledonia .
Parachute trainees undergo their initial training at San Diego . This included leaps from platform s
Marine Division and both believed that "th e Marine Corps wasn't an outfit that needed thes e specialties ." They made their thoughts on th e subject known to Headquarters .
The chronic shortage of aircraft also continue d to hobble the program . In the summer of 1943 the Corps had just seven transport squadrons , with only one more on the drawing boards . If the entire force had been concentrated in one place , it could only have carried about one and a hal f battalions . As it was, three squadrons were bran d new and still in the States and another one operated out of Hawaii . There were only three in th e South Pacific theater . These were fully engage d in logistics operations and were the sole asse t available to make critical supply runs on short notice . As an example, the entire transport force in New Caledonia spent the middle of Octobe r 1942 ferrying aviation gas to Guadalcanal, 10 Department of Defense (USMC) 127- GC-121-402906 to practice the proper landing technique . drums per plane, in the aftermath of the bombardment of Henderson field by Japanese battleships . They also evacuated 2,879 casualties during the course of that campaign . Senior commands would have been unwilling to divert the planes from such missions for the time required t o train the crews and parachutists for a mass jump in an operation . The Army's transport fleet was equally busy and MacArthur would not assembl e enough assets to launch his first parachute assaul t of the Pacific war until September 1943 (a regimental drop in New Guinea supported by 96 C47s) .
The regiment was unable to do any jumpin g after May 1943 due to the lack of aircraft . The 2 d Battalion's last jump was a night drop from 1 5 Army Air Corps C-47s . The planes came over Tontouta off course . Unaware of the problem , the Marines jumped out onto a hilly, woode d
At the completion of his jump from the Hightstow n fly-away tower, a Marine learns how to control his
area . One parachutist died and 11 were injured . Thereafter, the parachutists focused on amphibious operations and ground combat . Lieutenan t Colonel Victor H . Krulak drew rubber boats for his 2d Battalion and worked on raider tactics . I n late August, I MAC contemplated putting them to work seizing a Japanese seaplane base at Rekat a Bay on Santa Isabel, but the enemy evacuated th e installation before the intended D-Day .
Near the end of April 1943, Rockey suggeste d to the Commandant that the Corps disband th e parachute school at New River and use its personnel to form the fourth and final battalion . He estimated that production of 30 new jumpers pe r week at San Diego would be sufficient to maintain field units at full strength . The reduction in school overhead and the training pipeline woul d relieve some of the pressure on Marine manpower, while the barracks and classroom space at New River would meet the needs of the burgeon - Transport planes were hard to come by in th e States, too, and the outfit never conducted a tactical training jump during its brief existence .
Choiseul
The Allied campaign in the Central Solomons had as its ultimate objective the encirclement an d neutralization of the major Japanese air and nava l base of Rabaul . As the South Pacific comman d contemplated its next step toward that goal, it initially focused on the Shortland Islands, but thes e were too heavily defended in comparison with Halsey's South Pacific command had too few still were contesting control of the air overhea d transports and Marines to make a direct assault on and small bands of soldiers were roaming the junthe strongly garrisoned airfields on the northern gle . Enemy planes struck the parachute battaland southern tips of Bougainville, so he decided ion's small convoy of three APDs and an LST as it to seize the Empress Augusta Bay region midway unloaded and put two bombs into the tank landup the western side of the island and build his ing ship just as it was preparing to beach . It san k own air bases . Defenses there were negligible in shallow water, which allowed most of the and Bougainville's difficult terrain would prevent troops to make it ashore . But 14 paratroopers any rapid reaction from enemy ground forces died and the battalion lost most of its supplies an d located elsewhere on the island . unit equipment . Once established in camp, the D-Day for the Empress Augusta Bay operation parachutists conducted patrols to search fo r was 1 November 1943 . Two regiments of the 3d Japanese stragglers on the island . The rest of the Marine Division, two raider battalions (organized regiment arrived in Vella Lavella during the latte r as the 2d Raider Regiment), and the 3d Defense part of October. Battalion formed the assault echelon for the landAs the final planning for Bougainville progressed, the I MAC staff grew concerned that preliminary operations might make it obvious to the Japanese that an invasion was in the offing . To address that problem, in mid-October Majo r James C . Murray, staff secretary, advanced th e idea that a raid on Choiseul, might make the enemy think that it was the next objective . Even if that did not dissuade them about Bougainville , it might cause them to suspect that a U .S . landin g on Bougainville would come on the east coast , since Choiseul would be a move in that direction . On 20 October, Vandegrift brought Lieutenant Colonel Krulak, the 2d Battalion commander, to Guadalcanal for a conference with I MAC staffers, who outlined the scheme . The corps issued final orders on 22 October for the 2d Parachut e Battalion to begin the raid six days later.
Intelligence indicated there were up to 4,00 0 Japanese on the island, most of them dispersed i n small camps along the coast awaiting transportation for a withdrawal to Bougainville . Their supply situation supposedly was poor, although planners believed they still had most of their weapons , to include mortars and light artillery . The 2d Parachute Battalion's mission was to land at an undefended area near Voza, conduc t raids along the northwestern coast, select a sit e for a possible PT [patrol torpedo] boat base, and withdraw after 12 days if the Navy decided it di d not want to establish a PT boat facility . The parachutists were to give the enemy the impressio n that they were a large force trying to seiz e Choiseul . To beef up the battalion's firepower, I MAC attached a platoon of machine guns from th e regimental weapons company and an experimental rocket platoon . (The latter unit-a lieutenant and eight men-had 40 of these fin-stabilized, 65 -pound weapons . They were not very accurate , but their 1,000-meter range and large warhea d gave the lightly armed battalion a hefty punch .) A detachment of four landing craft would remain with the force and give it some mobility. A Navy PBY also landed at Choiseul and brought out a n Australian coastwatcher, Carden W. Seton, who would accompany the raid force and ensure i t received the full support of local natives . Altogether the reinforced battalion numbered about 700 men . Krulak planned a night landin g at 0100 on 28 October. His order emphasized the nature of the operation : The "basic principle is strike and move ; avoid decisive engagement with superior forces ."
Early in the evening of 27 October, four APDs and the destroyer Conway 
Local natives had already blazed a trail through the jungle and now provided bearers to assist in moving supplies . The parachutists created a dummy supply dump of empty boxes on a beac h two miles to the north to invite enemy attention to the landing . To back up the diversion, on 3 0 October Halsey's command released to the pres s news of the invasion by paratroopers . At leas t one newspaper illustrated the story with fancifu l drawings of parachutists floating down from th e sky .
In the afternoon a small Marine patrol move d west along the seacoast to investigate possibl e sites for a PT base . Two other native patrol s working farther away from Voza provided the battalion with information on the nearest Japanes e dispositions . Approximately 200 enemy were guarding a barge station at Sangigai to the southeast, while another force was 18 miles to th e northwest beyond the Warrior River. Krula k decided to attack Sangigai on the 30th . On the 29th he sent out several patrols and personally led one to reconnoiter the objective . Krulak's reinforced squad encountered 10 Japanese unloadin g a barge near Sangigai and killed seven of them . Later in the day an outpost drove off a Japanes e platoon and killed seven more enemy soldiers . Some of the patrols observed considerable barg e traffic moving along the coast .
On 30 October, two companies reinforced b y machine guns and rockets moved overlan d toward Sangigai . Company E continued down the Department of Defense (USMC) 127-GC-248-35436 Navy Lieutenant Robert Leonard, a parachutequalified doctor, poses with a Johnson ligh t machine gun at Camp Elliott in February 1943 . Paratroopers preferred the Johnson family of weapons due to their accuracy and reliability, bu t they were never produced in adequate numbers to fully equip Marine jump units . beach trail while Company F split off and move d inland to take the base from the rear. Early in th e morning, a prearranged air strike of 12 torped o bombers had hit identified enemy positions jus t outside Sangigai . When Company E approache d the same area at 1430, it executed a bombardmen t with its mortars and 36 of the experimental rockets . The Japanese retreated to the interior afte r being hit by the barrage, with the apparent intent of occupying prepared defensive works locate d there . They arrived at their destination at the same time that Company F was approaching th e area . The Marines, still in a single-file approach formation, were almost as surprised as the enemy ; they received only the briefest warning from th e accompanying native scouts . The lead platoon of parachutists reacted immediately and attacked; the next platoon in line moved out to the right of the route of march to flank the Japanese . The enemy occupied their positions and responde d with rifles, machine guns, and knee mortars . After 15 minutes of heavy fighting the parachutist s were making slow progress, when the Japanese suddenly launched a Banzai-style attack . Marine machine guns cut them down and stopped th e charge in short order. Company F's 3d platoo n then moved out to the left to cut off the enemy' s retreat, but the Japanese ran headlong into the 2 d Platoon instead and lost yet more men . About 40 escaped the net, but they left 72 dead on the battlefield .
While that fight raged in the jungle, Company E entered Sangigai unopposed . It destroyed supplies, installations, defensive positions, and one barge . Captured documents included a chart pinpointing minefields off Bougainville . The company then linked up with landing craft and made it back to base that evening . Casualties slowed the movement of Company F through the dense jungle and it ended up spending the night near th e coast before getting boated back to Voza the next day . The cost of the victory was 6 dead, 1 missing, and 12 wounded, the last figure includin g Krulak, who suffered wounds in his face and ar m from fragments . A flying boat evacuated th e severest casualties and picked up the invaluabl e mine charts .
On 1 November, Major Warner T. Bigger, th e battalion executive officer, launched an operatio n in the other direction with the goal of destroying barges in Choiseul Bay and bombarding enemy installations on Guppy Island . Major Bigger an d a reinforced Company G (less one rifle platoon) rode landing craft to the Warrior River, where the y left their sole radio and a security team befor e moving overland toward their objective . Things began to go wrong thereafter. The native scouts were unfamiliar with the area and the patrol soo n found itself going in a circle . Bigger and his forc e bivouacked for the night, but he sent one squa d back to the Warrior River to make a report to battalion by radio .
At dawn on 2 November, the squad and radi o team awoke to find a Japanese platoon in the immediate vicinity . After a firefight, the Marines broke contact and joined up with the boats , which were waiting along the coast at Nukiki . O n the way back to Voza they observed eigh t Japanese barges at Moli Island, which indicate d there was an even larger enemy force betwee n the two wings of the 2d Battalion . Concerned that Major Bigger's force might be cut off, Krulak requested air and PT support from I MAC and ordered the landing craft to return to the Warrior River . Company G had moved out for Choiseul Bay at 0630 and met up with a local native wh o guided them to the coast . They encountered an occupied bunker on the beach and killed fiv e Japanese, then set up their 60mm mortars an d fired 142 rounds onto Guppy Island . (To obtain a clear area to fire the mortars, the Marines had t o set up their weapons in the sea with only th e upper half of the tubes projecting above the surface of the water.) The bombardment started several blazes, one obviously a burning fuel dump . The enemy replied with ineffective machine gu n fire from the island and farther up the coast .
Major Bigger and his main body returned t o the Warrior River at 1600 . They expected to mee t the landing craft there, but found none . When they attempted to cross the river to reach th e radio team (unaware that it was gone) they cam e under fire from Japanese forces . After 90 minute s of fighting, three boats appeared, with Marines o n board firing their weapons . The Japanese fire died down in the face of this new opposition an d Company G embarked in the midst of heavy rain and high seas . One craft hit a reef after retractin g from the beach and began to take on water . Then its engine died and it drifted toward the enemyheld beach . Two PT boats, one commanded b y Lieutenant (jg) John F . Kennedy, finally came o n the scene and took aboard the men on that boat .
A stick of Marines trails out of a transport plan e over Camp Gillespie in California . It was ofte n hard to obtain aircraft to make tactical jumps; in
Three aircraft appeared at the same time and covered the operation by strafing the shore . Th e combat patrol had killed 42 Japanese in several firefights and inflicted undetermined casualtie s and damage with its mortar fire . Marine losse s were 2 killed, 1 wounded, and 2 missing (native s later recovered the bodies of these two men) .
While Major Bigger operated to the northwest , Krulak dispatched platoon-size patrols to th e southeast toward Sangigai . Two of them mad e contact with smaller enemy units on 1 November . They dispatched at least 17 Japanese at the cost o f one Marine killed . Intelligence gathered by Marine and native patrols indicated that th e Japanese were moving from both directions t o recapture Voza and secure their barge lines and the important coastal track (the only trail fo r movement to the northwest) . There were an estimated 1,800 enemy troops to the southeast and possibly 3,000 in the opposite direction . Krulak assumed that the Japanese were becoming aware of the strength and limited mission of his forc e given the Marine withdrawals from Sangigai an d Choiseul Bay . On the afternoon of 2 November, he informed I MAC of developments and state d that his battalion could handle the enemy for a week, though increasing Japanese activity woul d hamper Marine patrol operations . In the meantime, he took steps to strengthen his defenses . He placed a platoon-size outguard on each flan k of Voza, put his demolition platoon to work laying mines, and requested that PT boats patrol the coast to hinder the approach of Japanese force s by barge .
this case, the parachutists were putting on a demonstration for visiting senior officers from th e Army and Navy .
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The corps staff had considered expanding the operation on 30 October by inserting the rest o f the parachute regiment . Now they radioed Krulak and asked him for his "frank suggestion whether we should remove your outfit tomorro w night ." The message ended with the straightforward assessment-"Feel your mission accomplished ." The parachute commander responde d that he expected a strong Japanese attack within 48 hours and recommended withdrawal in light o f I MAC's view that nothing further could be gained by continuing operations . Two days into th e Empress Augusta Bay landing, it must have bee n obvious to the Japanese that the west coast o f Bougainville was the main target and Choiseu l was a diversion .
In the afternoon of 3 November, the battalio n moved to the beach at Voza and established a perimeter pending the nighttime arrival of fou r LCIs (one of them a gunboat version to provid e covering fire) . The demolition platoon placed ou t hundreds of booby traps on avenues of approach , to include a rocket suspended in a tree and double-edged razor blades worked into palm trunk s (to discourage snipers from clambering into thei r habitual perches) . As darkness fell, native scouts reported that Japanese forces were moving closer and enemy patrols began to reach the Voza are a near midnight, as evidenced by exploding boob y traps . The three transport LCIs arrived just prior to that and beached by 0130 . The parachutists were completely loaded in less than 20 minute s and were back at Vella Lavella by 0800 . As the battalion marched to its camp, coastwatcher s were reporting the occupation of Voza by the enemy, who still were having difficulty with th e varied devices left by the Marines .
At a cost of 11 dead and 14 wounded, the 2d Battalion had killed a minimum of 143 Japanes e and seriously disrupted the movement of enem y forces from Choiseul to points northward. Th e minefield chart also provided a valuable assist to naval operations in the northern Solomons . Halsey ordered mines laid in the clear channels and they eventually sank two Japanese ships . I n retrospect, I MAC may have staged the operatio n too late and with too small a force to serve as a good diversion, though it did have some effect o n Japanese actions . The enemy apparently shuttled some troops from the Shortlands to Choiseul and on 1 November sent a heavy bomber strike to attack the task force they assumed would be located off the Voza beachhead . In any case, the raid kept the Japanese high command guessin g for a time and certainly must have given them reason to be concerned about the prospect of future attacks of a similar nature . Lieutenant Colone l Williams later would call the Choiseul operatio n "a brilliant little bit of work . "
Bougainville
On 1 November 1943, the 3d and 9th Marines , assisted by the 2d Raider Battalion, seized a swat h of Bougainville's coast from Cape Torokina to the northwest . At the same time, elements of the 3d Raider Battalion assaulted Puruata Island just of f the cape . The single Japanese company and on e 75mm gun defending the area gave a good account of themselves until overwhelmed by th e invasion force . Over the next several days th e Marines advanced inland to extend their perimeter . There were occasional engagements with small enemy patrols, but the greatest resistance during this period came from the terrain, whic h consisted largely of swampland and dense jungl e beginning just behind the beach . The thing mos t Marines remembered about Bougainville was the deep, sucking mud that seemed to cover everything not already underwater.
Japanese resistance stiffened as they move d troops to the area on foot and by barge . The Marines fought several tough battles in midNovember and suffered significant casualties trying to move forward through the thick vegetation , which concealed Japanese defensive position s until the Marines were just a few feet away . Heavy rains and the ever-present mud mad e logistics a nightmare and quickly exhausted th e troops . Nevertheless, the perimeter continued t o expand as I MAC sought an area large enough t o protect the future airfields from enemy interference . By 20 November, I MAC had all of the 3 d Marine Division and the 37th Infantry Division , plus the 2d Raider Regiment, on the island . In accordance with the original plan, corps headquarters arranged for the parachute regiment to come forward in echelon from Vella Lavella an d assume its role as the reserve force . The 1s t Parachute Battalion embarked on board ships o n 22 November and arrived at Bougainville the nex t day, where it joined the raider regiment i n reserve .
The corps planners wanted to make aggressive Tables of Organization   en the Plans and Policies Division a t Headquarters made its initial request in Ma y 1940 for input on a Marine parachute program, i t suggested that planners work with a notional organization of one infantry battalion reinforced by a platoon of pack howitzers and some light antiaircraft and anti-tank weapons . In late October 1940, the Commandant determined that each infantry regiment would train one of its battalions as air infantry, with one company of each such battalion prepared t o conduct parachute operations . He estimated tha t would require 750 parachutists, about the numbe r originally envisioned for a separate battalion . However, those men would now double as regula r infantry and help fill spaces in the chronicall y undermanned line units . That idea did not last lon g and the Corps soon began talking about multiple battalions specializing in parachute operations .
The first official parachute table of organization , issued in March of 1941, authorized a battalion o f three line companies and a headquarters unit . Th e line companies consisted of a weapons platoon (three 60mm mortars and three light machine guns) and three rifle platoons of three 10-man squads (armed with six rifles, two Browning Automatic Rifle s [BARs] , and two Thompson submachine guns) . Th e standard squad for regular infantry at the time wa s nine men, with eight rifles and a single BAR. The 3 4 officers and 832 enlisted men of an infantry battalion dwarfed the 24 officers and 508 enlisted men of a parachute battalion, with the main difference coming from the former's company of heavy weapons . The parachutists lacked the large-caliber mortars, watercooled machine guns, and antitank guns possesse d by the infantry, but made up for it in part with a much greater preponderance of individual automati c weapons .
Once the United States entered the war, the parachute units went through the same process of experimentation in structure as the rest of the Corps . A 1942 revision to the tables did away with th e weapons platoons, distributing one 60mm mortar t o each rifle platoon and getting rid of the machin e guns . The latter change was not as drastic as it migh t appear, since each rifle squad was to have thre e Johnson light machine guns . The remaining "riflemen" were supposed to carry Reising submachin e guns . This mix of automatic weapons theoretically gave the parachute squad an immense amount o f firepower . As things turned out, the Johnson took a long time to get to the forces in the field and th e Reising proved to be an unreliable weapon .
The 1943 tables created a regimental structur e consisting of a headquarters company and a weapons company. The latter unit of seven officers and 172 men served as a pool of extra firepower fo r the lightly armed battalions . The company was supposed to field four 81mm mortars, one dozen each of the air-cooled and water-cooled .30-caliber machine guns, two .50-caliber machine guns, two bazookas , and eight grenade launchers . Headquarters also authorized a change in the size of the battalions fro m 24 officers and 508 enlisted Marines to 23 officers and 568 enlisted . The additional personnel were al l in the headquarters company, though 33 of them formed a demolitions platoon that did add directly to the battalion's combat power. Beyond that, I MA C allowed the line companies to reestablish weapons platoons exactly like those deleted in 1942 . That move increased the authorized strength of each battalion by another three officers and 87 enlisted me n (though manpower for these units was often take n out of hide) . The new rifle squad of 11 men was supposed to have three Johnson machine guns, three Johnson rifles, and five Reisings, but by this time the parachute regiment informally had adopted the fir e team concept of three three-man teams and a squa d leader .
tion throughout the afternoon . )
At 1600, the landing craft arrived off the beac h and made a run in to pick up the raid force . Th e Japanese focused their mortar fire on the boat s and the sailors backed off . They tried again almost immediately, but again drew back due to the intense bombardment from the beach . Things looked bleak as the onset of night reduced visibility to zero in the dense jungle and increased the likelihood of a strong enemy counterattack . Ammunition stocks were dwindling rapidly an d weapons failed due to heavy firing and the accu - ducting an orderly backload. After a thorough search to ensure that no one remained behind , the final few Marines stepped onto the last wav e of landing craft and pulled out to sea at 2100 .
The raid might be counted a failure since it did not go according to plan, but it did achieve som e positive things . The day of fighting in the mids t of the enemy supply dump destroyed considerable stocks of ammunition, food, and medica l supplies . Rough estimates placed Japanese casualties at nearly 300 dead and wounded, thoug h there was no way to confirm whether this figur e was high or low . Undoubtedly the aggressiv e operation behind the lines caused the enemy to worry that the Americans might repeat the tacti c elsewhere with better luck . The Marine forc e attained these ends at considerable cost . Tota l casualties were 17 dead, 7 missing, and 9 7 wounded (two-thirds of them requiring evacuation) . In one day of fighting the parachute battalion lost nearly 20 percent of its strength, as well as many weapons and individual items of equipment . The unit was not shaken, but it was severely bruised .
While the 1st Battalion prepared for its trial b y fire at Koiari, the rest of the regiment temporaril y enjoyed a morale-boosting turkey dinner o n Thanksgiving Day . (Many of the parachutists awoke that night with a severe case of diarrhea , probably induced by some part of the meal that had gone bad.) On 3 December, the regimental headquarters, the weapons company, and the 3d Battalion embarked on five LCIs and joined a small convoy headed for Bougainville . The regiment received its first taste of action that evenin g when Japanese aircraft attacked at sundown . Accompanying destroyers downed three of th e interlopers in a short but hot fight and the ship s sailed on unharmed . The convoy deposited th e parachutists in the Empress Augusta Bay perimeter the next day and they went into bivouac adjacent to the 1st Battalion . They did not have to Early December reconnaissance by the 3d Marine Division indicated that the Japanese were not occupying the high ground on the west side of the Torokina River, just to the east of th e perimeter. The division commander decided t o expand his holdings to include this key terrain , but the difficulty of supplying large forces in forward areas deterred him from immediately moving his entire line forward . His solution was the creation of strong outposts to hold the groun d until engineers cut the necessary roads . On 5 December, corps attached the parachute regimen t (less the 1st and 2d Battalions) to the 3d Division , which ordered this fresh force to occupy an d defend Hill 1000, while other elements of the division outposted other high ground nearby .
To accomplish the mission, Williams decide d to turn his rump regiment into two battalions by creating a provisional force consisting of th e weapons company, headquarters personnel, and Department of Defense (USMC) 6978 3 trees who are attempting to knock out a capture d field gun which was turned against them . Th e boxes on the sand contain ammunition for th e 37mm field piece . the 3d Battalion's Company I . The parachutists moved out on foot from their bivouac at 113 0 with three days of rations and a unit of fire in thei r packs . By 1800 they were in a perimeter defense around the peak of Hill 1000, 3d Battalion (less I Company) on the south and the provisional uni t to the north . Supply proved to be the first difficulty, as "steep slopes, overgrown trails, and dee p mud" hampered the work of carrying parties . Division eventually had to resort to air drops t o overcome the problem . While some parachutists labored to bring up food and ammunition, other s patrolled the vicinity . Beginning on the 6th, the outpost line began to turn into a linear defense as the division fed more units forward . The small parachute regiment had a hard time trying to cover its 3,000 yards of assigned frontage on to p of the sprawling, ravine-pocked, jungle-covere d hill mass .
On 7 December a 3d Battalion patrol discovered abandoned defensive positions on an east -33 Department of Defense (USMC) 127-GC-495-538 1 Private First Class Henry J. Kennedy, right, a n instructor, gives pointers to Father Joseph P . With no map and only vague directions as a guide, the unit could not find its objective in the dense jungle and remained out of touch until the next day . That night a smal l Japanese patrol probed the lines of the regimen t and the enemy re-occupied the position on th e east spur. On the morning of 8 December, a patrol from the provisional battalion investigate d the spur and a Japanese platoon ambushed it . The parachutists returned to friendly lines with one man missing . They reorganized and departed an hour later to search for him and tangled with the enemy in the same spot . This time they suffered eight wounded in a 20-minute firefigh t and withdrew. Twice during the day the regimen t received artillery and mortar fire, which i t believed to be friendly in origin . The rounds knocked out the regimental command post's telephone communications and caused five serious casualties in Company K .
In light of the increasing enemy activity, Williams decided to straighten out his lines an d establish physical contact between the flanks o f the battalions . This required the right flank of Company I and the left flank of Company K t o advance . On the morning on 9 December, Majo r Vance personally led a patrol to reconnoiter the new position . Eight Japanese manning three machine guns ambushed that force and it withdrew, leaving behind one man . At 1415, the left half of Company K attacked . Within 20 minutes , strong Japanese rifle and machine gun fire brought it to a halt . Although after-action report s from higher echelons later indicated only that Company I did not move forward, those Marine s fought hard that day and suffered casualtie s attempting to advance . Among others, the executive officer, First Lieutenant Milt Cunha, wa s killed in action and First Sergeant I . J . Fansler, Jr . had his rifle shot out of his hands .
The inability of Company I to make progres s enlarged the dangerous gap in the center of th e regiment's line . Vance ordered two demolitio n squads to refuse K's left flank and Williams sent a platoon of headquarters personnel from the provisional battalion to fill in the remainder of th e hole . Snipers infiltrated the Marine line and th e regimental commander turned most of his command post group into a reserve force to backsto p the rifle companies . The parachutists called i n artillery to Company's K's front and Japanese fire finally began to slacken after 1615 . The fightin g was intense and Company K initially reported casualties of 36 wounded and 12 killed . That figure later proved too high, though exact losses in the attack were hard to ascertain since the parachutists had 18 men missing and took casualtie s in other actions that day. Major Vance suffered a gunshot wound in the foot and turned over th e battalion to Torgerson .
The executive officer of the 21st Marines wa s in the area, apparently reconnoitering prior to hi s regiment taking over that portion of the front the next day . He responded to a request for assistance and had his Company C haul ammunition up to the parachutists . When those Marines completed that task, he offered to have them bolste r the parachute line and Williams accepted . For th e rest of the night the parachute regiment fire d artillery missions at 15-minute intervals agains t likely enemy positions . The Japanese responde d with occasional small arms fire . Division shifte d
Parachute Accident s D espite the inherent danger of jumping out of a plane high above the ground, the Marine parachute program had very few accidents . That may have been due in part to the system initially used t o prepare the parachutes . From the very first training class, the Corps set the standard that each jumpe r would pack his own parachute . In addition, a traine d rigger supervised the task and had to sign his nam e on the tag before the parachute was certified for use . (Later this procedure was dropped and riggers packed all parachutes for use in the FMF, but by that time Marines were making very few jumps .) The record indicates only one Marine accident that may have involved a malfunctioning parachute . During training on New Caledonia, one man's main parachute failed to open properly. He pulled the ripcor d on his reserve, but it just had time to begin deploying when he hit the ground . Observers thought , however, that the main parachute did not deploy because the suspension lines tangled up in the Marine's rifle .
Three other men died in Marine Corps jumpin g accidents not related to the performance of the parachute . Two men drowned after landing in water ; on e at Norfolk, Virginia, and one at New River, Nort h Carolina . The final fatality occurred when a Ne w River trainee lost his nerve just as he approached th e door of the plane . He moved out of the line of jumpers, but his static line became tangled with th e next man to go out . The non-jumper's parachut e opened while he was inside the plane and the billowing chute slammed him against the aircraft body hard enough to wreck the door and sever his spine .
The most unusual accident occurred near San Diego, California, on 15 May 1941 . Second Lieutenant Walter A . Osipoff and 11 enlisted men o f Company A were making a practice jump over Kearney Mesa . Everyone else had exited the plan e and he threw out a cargo pack, which possibly tangled in his static line . His parachute opened prematurely while he was still in the door of the plane ; i t billowed outside the aircraft and pulled him out, bu t the canopy and suspension lines tangled in the bundle of static lines streaming beside the transport . For a moment the cargo pack, Osipoff, and his partially opened parachute were all suspended from the cabl e that held the static lines . Under this combined load the bracket holding one end of the cable gave way and it streamed out the door . The cargo pack fel l away, but Osipoff and his parachute remained dangling from the cable and static lines, suspende d behind the plane's tail . The accident also ruined hi s reserve chute and ripped away the part of his harnes s attached to his chest . He ended up being dragge d through the air feet-first, held only by the leg straps .
The crew of the plane attempted to pull him i n but could not do so . Since the transport had no radi o communications, the pilot flew it over the field a t Osipoff suffered severe cuts and bruises and a fractured vertabra . He spent three months in a bod y cast, but fully recovered and returned to jump status . Lowery and McCants received Distinguished Flyin g Crosses for their successful rescue . the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, to a reserve position behind Hill 1000 and placed the parachut e regiment under the tactical control of the 9th Marines, scheduled to occupy the line on their left the next day.
That was not the only action for the parachutists on 9 December. That morning the provisional battalion had sent a platoon of Company I reinforced by two weapons company machin e gun squads on a patrol to circle the eastern spur and investigate the area between it and the Torokina River. The unit moved out to the northeast and reached the rear of Hellzapoppin Ridge , where it came upon two Japanese setting up a machine gun along the trail . The Marine poin t man observed the activity and alerted the patro l leader, Captain Jack Shedaker, who killed both i n quick succession with his carbine . Unbeknowns t to the Marines, they were in the midst of a Japanese ambush and the enemy immediatel y returned fire from positions in a swamp on th e left side of the trail . The first burst of fire kille d The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the United States . It first appeared as shown on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804 . With the stars changed to five points, the device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present day .
